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DA UBERT REVISITED
DON'T SHOOT THE MESSENGER BY ONE OF THE
MESSENGERS: A RESPONSE TO MERLINO ET AL.*
Simon A. Cole"
Oh, I see! It's my fault, is it? Oh, of course, there I was thinking it was your fault
because you've been left in charge, or Manuel's fault for not waking you, when all the
time it was my fault! Oh, it's so obvious now, I've seen the light!
-John Cleese, Fawlty Towers1
I. INTRODUCTION
In its Winter 2007 issue, the Tulsa Law Review published a Symposium Issue on
Daubert, Innocence, and the Future of Forensic Science.2 The Issue might be described
as a retrospective on the seminal 1993 United States Supreme Court decision Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms.,3 now widely described as the most important expert evidence
decision ever written by the Supreme Court, and its application to forensic science.
* My title is a reference to the second part of the title of Professor Risinger's contribution to the
Symposium Issue of the Tulsa Law Review to which this article is a reply. See D. Michael Risinger, Goodbye to
All That, or A Fool's Errand, by One of the Fools: How I Stopped Worrying about Court Responses to
Handwriting Identification (and "Forensic Science" in General) and Learned to Love Misinterpretations of
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 447 (2007). On a completely irrelevant note: the first part of
Professor Risinger's title refers to Robert Graves's memoir Goodbye to All That, whose discussion of the
experience of being gassed in the First World War indirectly inspired my undergraduate thesis on German
preparations for chemical warfare between the two world wars.
** Associate Professor of Criminology, Law & Society, University of California, Irvine; Ph.D. (Science &
Technology Studies), Cornell University; A.B., Princeton University. This project was funded in part by the
National Science Foundation (Award # SES-0347305). Any opinions, findings, conclusions or
recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the National Science Foundation. I am grateful to Gary Edmond, Craig Cooley, William C. Thompson, Jane C.
Moriarty, Tamara Piety, and especially Michael Risinger for reviewing and commenting on a draft of this
reply. I am grateful to the student editors for allowing me to write and publish this reply.
1. Fawlty Towers, "The Builders" (BBC Sept. 26, 1975) (TV series). This is considered by many among
the funniest lines from the BBC television comedy series Fawlty Towers, a mini-series about a cantankerous
innkeeper, his formidable wife, and the Barcelon6s bellhop, Manuel, which starred John Cleese shortly after
completing his stint in Monty Python's Flying Circus and is considered by many to be among the funniest
British television shows ever made. In 2000, it placed first on the British Film Institute's list of the 100 "all-
time top British television programmes." See British Film Institute, The BFI TV 100,
http://www.bfi.org.uk/features/tv/100/index.html (last updated Sept. 4, 2006).
2. 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 229 (2007).
3. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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Broadly speaking, Daubert, and the symposium essays centered around Daubert, might
be said to concern "the problem of expertise." 4 Given that courts have long allowed
expert witnesses to testify5 -and given the increasing use of such experts-how are
courts to evaluate the testimony of proffered "experts"? Ought anyone who claims the
mantle of expertise be permitted to testify in that guise? Or, should courts police claims
to the title of "expert" by permitting only those experts deemed legitimate to testify?
American courts have long tended toward the latter view; Daubert made this
commitment (in the federal courts and in the many jurisdictions that subsequently
adopted Daubert or Daubert-like rules) explicit. But, this preference only generates
another philosophical dilemma: how are courts supposed to adjudicate claims to
expertise when many, if not all, of those claims by their very nature are so technical that
legally-trained judges cannot reasonably be expected to be competent to sit in judgment
upon them?6 In other words, the law faces a specific instance of the question asked by
the philosophical field known as "epistemology": how does one certify knowledge as
legitimate?
To make the problem more concrete: if an individual-or, more likely, a group of
individuals-claims that they have a forensic assay that performs in a certain way (e.g.
identifies the source of trace, with some stated degree of discrimination and some stated
degree of accuracy), how are judges to evaluate this claim, given that they are not
themselves competent to perform the assay, or even in some cases to understand it? One
common approach relies on what is often-somewhat misleadingly-called "the
scientific method."7 Can we muster evidence that supports the claims made concerning
this assay? For example, one might design experiments to measure the performance of
the assay on a set of controlled test materials.
Of course, we would not realistically expect a judge to perform such an experiment
herself. A judge would hardly be the wisest person to select to conduct such an
experiment; the task ought to be delegated to someone competent to do so, probably
someone generally called a "scientist." However, even more than this, a now familiar
insight of the sociology of scientific knowledge holds that even scientists themselves
regularly evaluate knowledge claims without performing actual experiments themselves.
Were each scientist required to directly and independently experimentally validate each
knowledge claim that they accept in their work, the enterprise of science would grind to
a halt. Instead, scientists accept most knowledge claims through a social process of trust,
in which certain markers-prestige of journals, university affiliations, accolades of peers,
and so on-are taken as strong evidence of the veracity of the claims made.8 That this
trust-based system is sometimes abused-as when premature stem cell findings survive
the peer review process of the prestigious scientific journal Science as well as numerous
4. See generally Expertise in Regulation and Law 1-2 (Gary Edmond ed., Ashgate Pubig. Ltd. 2004).
5. See Tal Golan, Laws of Men and Laws of Nature: The History of Scientific Expert Testimony in
England and America (Hary. U. Press 2004).
6. See generally Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 Yale L.J.
1535 (1998).
7. See Susan Haack, Defending Science-Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism (Prometheus
Books 2003).
8. Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in the Seventeenth-Century England 23
(U. Chi. Press 1994).
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other instances -only serves to highlight the continuing assumption that the system
works well most of the time.10 In other words, we have, in part, what has been called a
"deference model" for trusting scientific claims: scientists believe claims because they
defer to the judgment of trusted peers whose expertise on the specific issue they deem
greater than their own (i.e. the peer reviewers of the article). Judicial evaluation of expert
evidence, it has been pointed out, also requires such a deference model and perhaps even
a stronger form than that found in science itself, and this notion may be found in both the
Daubert and the Frye regimes.12
It has not been lost on the philosophically minded that such a process necessarily
entails an infinite regress: the judge is asked to evaluate a self-professed claim to expert
knowledge, in large part, by deferring to another self-professed group of experts. But
how is the judge to know whether the experts to whom she defers are themselves truly as
expert as they say? To determine that, the judge would need to consult yet another group
of "meta-experts" 1 3 and so on ad infinitum.14 To this, the sociologically minded have
replied that, while the regress is true in principle, in practice the institution we know as
"science" continues to function by breaking the regress all the time. The regress is
broken simply by treating conventional markers of expertise-prestigious journals,
university affiliations, advanced degrees, and so on-as de facto indicators of genuine
expertise. While such a system is hardly failsafe, it is argued, it works well enough to
allow science to generally make progress.
All of this is to say that knowing when to trust scientific knowledge claims is a
difficult problem that, in principle, can, one hopes,1 5 be addressed by reference to
experiment and data, but that in practice, even within science itself, is often based in
larger part on a social process of trust. This problem, it might be said, underlies the
contributions to the Symposium Issue, which wrestle with the problem of how judges
should evaluate forensic scientific knowledge and-in the case of most of the
contributions-why judges have thus far done such a poor job of it.
It will not be lost on the reflexively minded that the Symposium Issue itself is
subject to the same epistemological problem that forms its subject of inquiry.16 That is to
say: the Symposium contributors themselves claim expertise on the topic of the use of
expert evidence in the American legal system. And yet, a consumer of their expertise
(i.e. a reader of the Symposium Issue) might reasonably ask why she should trust their
knowledge claims. It turns out, of course, that the Symposium Issue's claims to
legitimate knowledge are founded precisely on the same kind of social system of trust
9. See Jennifer Couzin, Stem Cells.. . And How the Problems Eluded Peer Reviewers and Editors, 311
Sci. 23 (Jan. 6, 2006).
10. And, indeed, the reason sanctions against abuses of the trust of the scientific communication process are
so severe is doubtless the awareness that the system is almost entirely self-policing.
11. Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
12. Brewer, supra n. 6, at 1627.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. It should be noted that not all, perhaps not even most, scientific knowledge claims are so simple that
they can be straightforwardly evaluated by experimental data.
16. "Reflexivity" is a term used by sociologists of science to denote the process of applying the same
sociological scrutiny to one's own knowledge claims that one applies to the knowledge claims of others. See
Malcolm Ashmore, The Reflexive Thesis: Wrighting Sociology ofScientific Knowledge (U. Chi. Press 1989).
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that underlies the scientific knowledge claims that form the Issue's subject: a reader
would tend to view the claims made in the Symposium Issue as legitimate simply
because they appear in a credentialed source-a scholarly journal-rather than a less
credentialed source, such as a blog or a vanity press.
Although, in principle, it would perhaps be desirable to independently evaluate all
of the knowledge claims made in the Symposium Issue, in practice to do so would bring
the knowledge production process to a halt. And so, readers invest a certain amount of
trust in the mere fact of being published in a journal. As noted above, there is nothing
especially wrong with this system (except to an excessively rigorous epistemologist), and
it is the same system used by those scholarly disciplines deemed most trustworthy and
prestigious in modem society, the natural sciences. However, it was also noted above
that the system has obvious potential deficiencies.
Recently, legal scholars have become increasingly candid in noting that, even
beyond the inescapable deficiencies that dog any deferential knowledge evaluation
system, legal scholarship suffers from additional deficiencies not shared by other
disciplines.17 The now familiar litany of criticisms include the fact that most law
journals, including the most prestigious ones, are not peer reviewed;18 that they are
edited by law students lower in the legal hierarchy than the authors of the articles; that
these students are unqualified to evaluate much of the scholarship they receive and
therefore are suspected of resorting to "crude credentialism" (which might be
distinguished from the sort of "reasonable credentialism" that we described above); 19
that the system of multiple submissions allows virtually all scholarship to be published
somewhere; and so on.20
It is not my intention to engage in that complicated debate here. I raise these
prefatory issues merely to make the point that a reader would ordinarily approach the
Symposium Issue from a perspective of credulity. Because of the imprimatur of being in
a scholarly journal, the reader would expect that the articles contained in the issue
include trustworthy expert knowledge about the problem of legal evaluation of expert
evidence. To be sure, the reader might find herself disagreeing with, or even doubting,
some of the claims made, but, nonetheless, these claims would-and probably should-
enjoy some a priori advantage over, say for example, claims made in an anonymously
posted Internet "blog."
And, yet upon inspection, this assumption becomes undermined because the
Symposium Issue turns out to be internally contradictory. Specifically, the issue is
internally inconsistent with regard to one hot-button issue discussed by many of the
contributors: the validity of latent print (fingerprint) identification. To illustrate, one
contribution stated, "as far as courts are concerned, there is no accuracy data for latent
print source attributions. In other words, there is no evidence, of the sort that
practitioners of [Evidence-Based Medicine] would consider 'evidence,' as to the
17. Elizabeth Chambliss, When Do Facts Persuade? Some Thoughts on the Market for "Empirical Legal
Studies", 71 L. & Contemp. Probs. 17 (2008).
18. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules ofInference, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 125 (2002).
19. See James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 527, 533 (1994).
20. Id. at 535.
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accuracy of this form of evidence."21 Other articles in the Symposium Issue would
appear to echo this judgment. One approvingly quotes the following statement:
fingerprinting's "reliability is unverified either by statistical models or fingerprint
variation or by consistent data on error rates."22 Another says "the science on which
many identification techniques, such as latent fingerprint[s] . . . are based, is at best of
questionable validity." 2 3 A third bluntly calls fingerprint evidence "lousy science." 24 A
fourth, almost as bluntly, calls it "the reigning champion of the non-science forensic
sciences . . . ."25 One article, however, takes a different view. Merlino et al. appear to
contradict all of the above assertions when they speak of "the methodology of latent print
examination (i.e. ACE-V), its reliability, [and] the methods used to test its
reliability .... 26
In short, the contributors to the Symposium Issue appear to disagree about the
validity of latent print identification with a clear majority holding that latent print
identification has not been validated. Thus far, there is nothing extraordinary going on; it
would appear that we have what is known as a "scholarly disagreement." There is
certainly nothing unusual about a symposium issue on a particular topic containing
different opinions, and even vigorous debate, on that topic. Consumers of scholarship are
certainly accustomed to such circumstances and well equipped to form their own
opinions, perhaps based on their own preconceived preferences, but preferably based on
the quality of argumentation and evidence put forward by the various debaters.
But the internal contradiction in the Symposium Issue is more than a routine
scholarly disagreement. In addition to critiquing the opinions of the other contributors,
Merlino et al. attack the qualifications to comment of one of the other contributors. They
do not merely critique what that contributor says, they critique that contributor's
authority to say it. Specifically, they state that one of the authors who argues that
21. Simon A. Cole, Toward Evidence-Based Evidence: Supporting Forensic Knowledge Claims in the Post-
Daubert Era, 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 263, 277 (2007).
22. Craig M. Cooley & Gabriel S. Oberfield, Increasing Forensic Evidence's Reliability and Minimizing
Wrongful Convictions: Applying Daubert Isn't the Only Problem, 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 285, 289 n. 37 (2007)
(quoting Donald Kennedy, Forensic Science: Oxymoron? 302 Sci. 1625, 1625 (2003)).
23. Ddirdre Dwyer, (Why) Are Civil and Criminal Expert Evidence Different? 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 381, 391
(2007).
24. Susan D. Rozelle, Daubert, Schmaubert: Criminal Defendants and the Short End of the Science Stick,
43 Tulsa L. Rev. 597, 597 (2007).
25. Michael J. Saks, Protecting Factfinders from Being Overly Misled, While Still Admitting Weakly
Supported Forensic Science into Evidence, 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 609, 611 (2007).
26. Mara L. Merlino, Victoria Springer, Jan Seaman Kelly, Derek Hammond, Eric Sahota & Lori Haines,
Meeting the Challenges of the Daubert Trilogy: Refining and Redefining the Reliability of Forensic Evidence,
43 Tulsa L. Rev. 417, 432 (2007). I must admit that I find Merlino et al.'s interpretation of Daubert as "refining
and redefining . . . reliability" puzzling. "Reliability"-or, as the Daubert court surely meant, "accuracy" or
"validity," are scientific concepts that cannot necessarily be "redefined" by a court. See infra n. 51. As I
understand it, Daubert changed the admissibility threshold to require evidence of reliability, rather than mere
relevance or "general acceptance" in a field. See Fed. R. Evid. 702; Frye., 293 F. 1013. Daubert did not
"redefine" the notion of reliability; it simply required that reliability-defined in the same way it always has
been defined-be shown for evidence to be admissible. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. The notion that Daubert
"redefined" reliability suggests that latent print identification may have satisfied some prior notion of
"reliability" only to have the Court "redefine" reliability. It suggests that the absence of evidence of reliability
was caused by shifting legal definitions rather than by the simple omission of empirical data gathering. In fact,
establishing the reliability of latent print identification has always simply required empirical evidence
concerning the extent to which latent print examiners produce correct results, regardless of what the courts say.
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fingerprinting has not been validated gave testimony that failed the Daubert
requirements, "assert[ed] that the identification sciences are unreliable, biased, or invalid
without any properly conducted research as a foundation for such assertions[,]" was
appropriately characterized by Judge Michael Brennan, a New York Supreme Court
judge, as a faux expert, and was precluded from testifying at trial "to [the] Judge['s] ...
credit." 27
This is a far more serious matter than a mere difference of opinion precisely
because, as discussed above, the reader's trust in what is said in a journal is almost
entirely based upon the implicit assumption that what is published in a journal is at least
in some degree trustworthy (or at least more trustworthy than something published with
what convention holds to be a lesser imprimatur of authority, like, say, a "blog"), in that
the authors were at least presumptively qualified to make the statements they made in
their contributions. Thus, unlike a routine scholarly disagreement, this attack by one
contributor on another contributor's qualifications might leave the consumer of the
information contained in a journal somewhat perplexed. If, as Merlino et al. claim, one
of the contributors to the Symposium is in the habit of making assertions "without any
properly conducted research as a foundation for such assertions," 28 why was that
contribution permitted to survive the editorial review process that supposedly polices the
quality of scholarship that appears in scholarly journals? If, on the other hand, Merlino et
al.'s claim is false, why was their false claim permitted to survive the editorial review
process that supposedly polices the quality of scholarship that appears in scholarly
journals? In short, because one group of contributors calls another contributor
unqualified to speak, the reader could only conclude that at least one of the contributions
must be untrustworthy (either the accuser or the accused), potentially and needlessly,
tainting an excellent collection of articles on an important subject.29
By now, it will probably come as no surprise if I disclose that I am the contributor
whose authority was questioned by Merlino et al. Since the Symposium authors did not
have access to one another's manuscripts prior to publication, I was not aware that my
article would appear in a Symposium Issue that also contained claims that might lead a
reader to conclude that my own article should not be trusted. I write this reply, not
because I object to the airing of the fact that I was once (more than once actually)
precluded from testifying at a criminal trial involving latent print evidence (as I was also
more than once permitted to testify at such trials)-indeed, I have aired that fact in
several of my own publications30-but, rather, because I am concerned that this fact has
27. Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 444. Note that in New York, the Supreme Court is the felony trial court.
The highest court is the New York Court of Appeals.
28. Id.
29. As already noted, the situation becomes even more acute if the reader is familiar with the perceived
credibility problems with legal scholarship and is aware of the uncomfortable facts that none of these articles
were peer reviewed and that they were selected through a process of invitation and evaluation by law students,
and so on. These issues are, of course, common to most law reviews, including many of those considered the
most prestigious and authoritative. At the same time, I am well aware that there were some unusual
circumstances in the case of the production of this particular Symposium Issue that caused this apparent
contradiction between its contents to fall through the cracks and that, under better circumstances, the
contradiction might have been detected and addressed earlier in the publication process by, for example,
allowing the authors to read and comment upon one another's papers.
30. Michael Lynch & Simon A. Cole, Science and Technology Studies on Trial: Dilemmas of Expertise, 35
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been presented in such a way as to cast doubt on the veracity of the assertions I made in
my contribution to the Symposium Issue. In scholarly discourse, the rhetorical tactic of
argumentum ad hominem, attacking one's opponents rather than their arguments-
"shooting the messenger," in colloquial terms-is considered not only unsporting but,
more importantly, a sign of a weak position. 3 1
In this reply, I will endeavor to clearly articulate-and support with evidence-just
what the facts are with regard to the latent print evidence and to the exclusion of my
testimony. In Part II, I will discuss use of my testimony by Merlino et al. as empirical
evidence supporting the reliability of latent print identification. I will show that the
preclusion of my testimony cannot serve as evidence of the reliability of latent print
identification. Nor can it serve, as Merlino et al. seem to claim, as an explanation for the
admissibility of latent print testimony in most U.S. criminal cases. Furthermore, Merlino
et al.'s focus on one judge's characterization of my testimony apparently distracted them
from engaging with the arguments of scholars, including myself, who have argued that
the reliability of latent print identification has not been established. In Part III, I discuss
the evidence that Merlino et al. adduce in support of the reliability of latent print
identification. I show that their arguments are unconvincing and that, in most cases, legal
scholars have pointed out the flaws in relying on the arguments they muster. I show that
Merlino et al. have not engaged with these arguments.
II. Is EVIDENCE RELIABLE IF ITS CRITICS ARE UNRELIABLE?
The Merlino et al. article contains several parts, one of which is "an empirical
content analysis of published judicial decisions concerning cases in which forensic
document and latent fingerprint expert testimony were challenged following the 1993
Daubert decision."32 This analysis, it is claimed, explains why "the majority of
[admissibility] challenges to [fingerprint] evidence have been unsuccessful."33 This is an
important question, one that is taken up by several other contributions to the Symposium
Issue. Most of the contributors blame pro-prosecution bias on the part of the judiciary, a
hypothesis that had earlier been advanced by Professor Risinger. 34 One article argues
"the judiciary has failed to apply Daubert's 'exacting standards' to forensic evidence
offered by the prosecution," 35 a view that, since the publication of the Symposium Issue,
has now been endorsed by a National Academy of Science report on forensic science. 36
Soc. Stud. of Sci. 269, 294-295 (2005); Simon A. Cole, A Cautionary Tale About Cautionary Tales About
Intervention, 16 Org. 121, 126 (2009) [hereinafter Cole, A Cautionary Tale]; Simon A. Cole, Does "Yes"
Really Mean Yes?: The Attempt to Close Debate on the Admissibility of Fingerprint Testimony, 45 Jurimetrics
449, 462 n. 84 (2005) [hereinafter Cole, Does "Yes" Really Mean Yes?].
31. See e.g. Epstein & King, supra n. 18, at 125.
32. Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 418.
33. Id. at 443.
34. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on
the Dock? 64 Alb. L. Rev. 99 (2000).
35. Cooley & Oberfield, supra n. 22, at 285 (footnote omitted).
36. Natl. Research Council of the Natil. Acads., Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path
Forward 85, 108-109 (Natl. Acads. Press 2009). "[T]here are serious issues regarding the capacity and quality
of the current forensic science system; yet, the courts continue to rely on forensic evidence without fully
understanding and addressing the limitations of different forensic science disciplines." Id. at 85. "[T]he
undeniable reality is that the community of forensic science professionals has not done nearly as much as it
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Another claims "there is some reason to believe that judges as a group are resistant to
rejecting prosecution proffers of expert testimony" 3 7 because:
when the issue is expertise that has been admitted without question for generations, and
which has played a role in convicting many people (often in cases tried in front of those
same judges in the past), and which the many judges who have been prosecutors before
ascending to the bench have used in trying cases and convicting defendants, then the
resistance becomes intense.38
A third suggests "that, almost regardless of the quality of the science involved, judges
tend to admit scientific evidence when it favors the prosecution while refusing to admit it
when it favors the defense."39 Another contributor suggests four different answers: poor
litigation by the defense bar; concerns about opening "the floodgates to appeal" if
fingerprint evidence were excluded; a belief that admissibility, even if erroneous, is
harmless because fingerprint evidence is always accompanied by corroborative evidence;
and the belief that government experts (which latent print examiners usually are), unlike
experts in civil litigation, are unbiased because they are public servants.40 Finally, it is
possible that evidence is routinely admitted simply in the spirit of inclusion, of erring on
the side of allowing potentially relevant evidence. But this fails to explain why there is
an "exclusionary ethos" in civil cases.41
Notice, however, that none of these contributors suggest that the reason latent print
identification survives admissibility challenges is that the proponents of the evidence
satisfied the Daubert reliability requirement. Merlino et al. offer a quite different answer
to this question, one that, unlike the others,42 purports to be based on empirical data.
Merlino et al. state, "[c]ritical examination of published decisions and transcripts of these
cases offers some insights into why" most admissibility challenges to latent print
evidence have been unsuccessful. 43 They then state that "[a] comprehensive discussion
of case law is beyond the scope of this paper . . . ."44 Instead, they "offer as one
example,"45 a single unpublished trial court decision, People v. Hyatt.46
In People v. Hyatt, as Merlino et al. correctly note, the defendant sought to proffer
my testimony at trial as rebuttal to the testimony of a latent print examiner who was
proffered to testify that the defendant was the source of a particular latent print from the
reasonably could have done to establish either the validity of its approach or the accuracy of its practitioners'
conclusions,' and the courts have been 'utterly ineffective' in addressing this problem." Id. at 108-109
(footnotes omitted).
37. D. Michael Risinger, Goodbye to All That, or A Fool's Errand, by One of the Fools: How I Stopped
Worrying about Court Responses to Handwriting Identification (and "Forensic Science" in General) and
Learned to Love Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 447,473 (2007).
38. Id. at 473-474 (footnote omitted).
39. Rozelle, supra n. 24, at 597 (footnotes omitted).
40. Dwyer, supra n. 23, at 391-392.
41. Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Daubert and the Exclusionary Ethos: The Convergence of Corporate
and Judicial Attitudes towards the Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Tort Litigation, 26 L. & Policy 231
(2004).
42. Except for Professor Risinger's earlier work, supra n. 34.
43. Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 443.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. No. 50115U (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 10, 2001).
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crime scene to the exclusion of all other possible sources in the universe. 4 7 The state
successfully challenged the admissibility of my testimony under New York's version of
the Frye general acceptance standard.4 8
A. Two Quibbles with Merlino et al.'s Characterization of My Testimony
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to correct two assertions by Merlino et
al. about my testimony in Hyatt, one of minor, and one of major, significance. First,
Merlino et al. note that the prosecutor established that I "never consulted with the
examiner who actually conducted the investigation to learn what methods and techniques
were used."4 9 While it is true that I did not consult with the latent print examiner, this
classic line of cross-examination questioning was irrelevant to the testimony I was
prepared to give. As I made clear in my testimony, I was prepared to testify that I had
been able to find no study validating any method of latent print analysis. 50 Therefore,
even giving the examiner the benefit of the doubt by assuming that he used what was
then widely viewed, at least in North America, as the premier method available (the
same "ACE-V method" described at length in Merlino et al.'s article),51 I could still
testify that I had been able to find no study validating whatever method the examiner
used. In other words, I gave the benefit of the doubt to the examiner by assuming that he
had used "ACE-V," the most credible method available. The only alternative to that
assumption was that he used a less regarded method, not a better one. Under such
circumstances, it was unnecessary to interview the examiner to determine which method
he used.
The second issue is more significant. Merlino et al. write that I was proffered to
"assert that the identification sciences are unreliable, biased, or invalid . . . ."52 This is
particularly important because Merlino et al. state that I made these assertions "without
any properly conducted research as a foundation . . . ," and that is why "it is to Judge
Hynes's [sic] credit that he . . ." precluded me from testifying at trial. 53
I have never written or testified that latent print identification is unreliable or
invalid. I have written and testified, in Hyatt and other cases, that its reliability54 is
47. See Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 436 (noting that the only incriminating conclusion latent print
examiners are permitted to reach is that the defendant is the source of the print).
48. See People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1994); Frye, 293 F. 1013.
49. Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 444.
50. See Tr. Transcr. at 38-41, Hyatt, No. 50115U (available at http://www.onin.com/fp/
ny v hyatt_simon cole testimony_4oct01 .pdf).
51. Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 432.
52. Id. at 444.
53. Id. The Judge's name was Michael Brennan. Charles Hynes was the Kings County District Attorney at
the time.
54. In this article, I will follow Merlino et al.'s terminology by using the term "reliability," the term used by
the Supreme Court in Daubert, to mean what scientists would mean by the terms "accuracy" or "validity." For
scientists, "reliability" refers to consistency of results, regardless of their truth value. "Accuracy" refers to the
degree to which results are, in fact, correct. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence:
Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1201 n. 20 (1980). Legal scholars
generally agree that when the Daubert Court said "reliability," it meant "accuracy," because it would defy
common sense for the Daubert Court to have intended to create an admissibility threshold that merely insisted
that expert evidence produce consistent results, regardless of whether those results were correct.
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unknown and that it has not been validated. 55 I have written and testified that there are
good theoretical reasons to believe that latent print identification is subject to the same
sorts of normal psychological biases as other observational tasks as well as perhaps a
pro-prosecution bias. I have never written or said that the "identification sciences" as a
whole are "biased." The distinction between asserting that the reliability of latent print
identification is unknown and asserting that latent print identification is unreliable would
not seem to be so subtle a distinction that Merlino et al. could not have been expected to
grasp it.
Thus, the crux of my proffered testimony was not, as Merlino et al. claim, that
latent print identification is unreliable, but rather, that we have no good data on its
reliability. If this was the nature of my testimony, then what would count as "properly
conducted research as a foundation for such" an assertion? I cannot think of anything
other than what I actually did: using the tools of the historian of science, I researched the
scientific, professional, and legal literature about latent print identification in search of
data concerning the reliability of the technique. I found none, and I so testified. I cannot
help noting that, if my assertion were false, it could have been more efficiently refuted
by producing the reliability data that I claimed did not exist than by attacking my
research methods. That an advocate, on cross-examination, might choose the less
efficient route of attacking me, rather than producing the data, is perhaps understandable.
For scholars to do so is less understandable.
Although Merlino et al.'s symmetrical notion that my testimony should be held "to
Cole's own high standards"5 7 has superficial appeal, it actually satisfies neither logic nor
efficiency because latent print examiners and I make very different knowledge claims. A
latent print examiner testifies that the defendant is the source of a particular latent print
to the exclusion of all other possible sources. Since the consumer of the evidence (the
court) has no way of determining the actual truth of this claim, Daubert directs that it
inquire instead about the general reliability of people like this witness making claims of
55. See Tr. Transcr., supra n. 50, at 28-29.
Q: Is it your opinion, Dr. Cole, your position, based upon your experience and study, that
the fingerprint matching process that is used by examiners is not reliable?
A: It's my opinion that its reliability has not been measured. It may or may not be
reliable, but we don't know because we haven't tried to find out, we haven't tested it or
measured it. It's an unknown reliability.
Q: But are you saying that it's not reliable evidence?
A: It is of unknown reliability. It may turn out that it's reliable, it may turn out that it's
not very reliable, we just don't know how reliable it is, I don't know either.
Id. at 28-29, 61.
56. Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 985, 1060-1061 (2005); see also Itiel E. Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors,
56 J. Forensic Identification 600 (2006); Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts
Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 Forensic Sci. Intl. 74 (2006); Itiel E. Dror et al., When
Emotions Get the Better of Us: The Effect of Contextual Top-down Processing on Matching Fingerprints, 19
Applied Cognitive Psychol. 799 (2005); Dan E. Krane et al., Sequential Unmasking: A Means of Minimizing
Observer Effects in Forensic DNA Interpretation, 53 J. Forensic Sci. 1006 (2008); Larry S. Miller, Procedural
Bias in Forensic Science Examinations ofHuman Hair, 11 L. & Hum. Behav. 157 (1987); D. Michael Risinger
et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of
Expectation and Suggestion, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2002).
57. Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 444.
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this nature. Hence, there is a demand for reliability data about latent print identification.
Of course, reliability data will not definitely inform the court about the truth of the
witness's claims in the instant case. Even if general reliability data for latent print
identification shows high reliability, the examiner could be wrong in the particular case.
And, if reliability data is low, the examiner could be correct. Knowing general reliability
is, therefore, a second-best solution for those situations (which are most situations) when
the accuracy of specific claims cannot be directly ascertained.
When I testify as a rebuttal witness, I testify that the aforementioned reliability
data does not exist. I reached this conclusion by conducting a literature review. One
could perhaps inquire about the reliability of the methods I used to reach that
conclusion-whether I properly conducted the literature review-but why opt for the
second best solution? The claim that reliability data does not exist can be directly and
conclusively refuted simply by producing reliability data. Of course, one cannot prove a
negative, and the fact that no one has yet produced reliability data after eight years of
admissibility battles and more than a score of scholarly articles on the subject58 does not
absolutely prove that reliability data does not exist. But, nonetheless, the more effective
and efficient way to attack the claim that I make would be to refute it directly rather than
to attack the methods that produced it. That a prosecutor would, on tactical grounds,
choose this option is perhaps understandable, but that scholars would endorse it is less
so.
B. The Use of Hyatt in Merlino et al.'s Empirical Project
But let us turn now to the more important issue: the role of Hyatt in Merlino et al.'s
argument. Merlino et al., recall, promised an explanation as to why admissibility
challenges to latent print identification almost always fail, an explanation derived from
an empirical analysis of "case law" 59 (actually cases made available in legal research
databases).60 They, then, in the interest of brevity, chose to discuss only one of those
58. See infra n. 96.
59. Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 418.
60. Although it is not crucial to my argument, I feel it is necessary to comment briefly on Merlino et al.'s
use of concepts drawn from the discipline in which I was trained, Science & Technology Studies, to explain the
preclusion of my testimony. They state that "[b]oth boundary work and experimenters' regress are clearly
evident in the transcript [of Hyatt]." Id. at 443. "Boundary work" is a term devised by Professor Gieryn to
denote the process by which scientists define the boundaries of what counts as science or, in some cases, as a
particular scientific discipline. Thomas F. Gieryn, Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-
Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists, 48 Am. Sociological Rev. 781 (1983).
Merlino et al. apparently derive their notion of boundary work from Professor Jasanoff. Sheila Jasanoff, What
Judges Should Know About the Sociology ofScience, 32 Jurimetrics J. 345 (1992). The boundary work in Hyatt
is clear enough: the court reasoned that only latent print examiners are qualified to serve as experts on the
validity (or "reliability") of latent print identification (reasoning that, incidentally, would also result in only
practicing astrologers being qualified to serve as experts on the validity of astrology). Jasanoff had invoked the
notion of "boundary work" as an explanation of scientists' behavior in an article intended to educate judges
about the behavior of scientists. Moreover, Jasanoff's stance toward boundary work was descriptive, not
normative; she noted that it might reflect either efforts to "insulate[ ] scientific work from unexpected and
possibly ill-motivated challenges by inadequately credentialed critics" or efforts "to deflect criticism that is not
only unwelcome but well founded." Id. at 349. Jasanoff's message to judges-"What Judges Should Know"-
was that they should be alerted to the fact that some utterances by scientists might be properly understood as
exercises of boundary work rather than as factual statements about the world. As Jasanoff notes, such exercises
in boundary work might serve good purposes or ill ones. Id. Merlino et al., however, invoke boundary work as
an explanation for a judge's behavior. Moreover, they seem to view the judge's employment of boundary work
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cases, Hyatt, in depth. It should be clear, however, from the preceding discussion that
Hyatt cannot explain why admissibility challenges to latent print identification are
seldom successful for the simple reason that it was not an unsuccessful admissibility
challenge to latent print identification. Instead, it was a successful admissibility
challenge to the proffered testimony of a fingerprint rebuttal witness. In other words,
Merlino et al. purport to explain the admissibility of latent print evidence by reference to
a case that was not about the admissibility of latent print evidence.
This lumping together for analysis of cases with different procedural postures is a
general weakness of Merlino et al.'s methods. Merlino et al. performed a content
analysis on a data set generated from "a subset of the total number of cases published on
Lexis in which the admissibility of expert testimony about forensic document
examination or latent print examination was challenged."61 This data set contains both
trial and appellate court opinions. But the decisions facing trial and appellate courts are
quite different. A trial court decides, within its discretion, whether to admit evidence. An
appellate court decides whether the trial court's decision was an abuse of that
discretion.62 These are quite distinct decisions, but Merlino et al. mixed these two sets of
observations in a single set of combined results.
Hyatt, meanwhile, differs perhaps even more greatly from the other cases in
Merlino et al.'s data set. Whereas the other cases involve challenges to the admissibility
of the testimony of a latent print examiner, Hyatt involved a challenge to the
admissibility of the testimony of a social scientist claiming expertise on the validity, or
lack thereof, of latent print identification. These are two quite different things. I am at a
loss to understand why Merlino et al. would select a single case in a procedural posture
unique to their data set to explain the rest of the data set. Generally, if one were going to
select only one case to explain a data set, one would want to select the most
representative case.63 As far as I can determine, Merlino et al. had a data set of thirty-
eight challenges to the admissibility of latent print testimony and one challenge to the
testimony of a rebuttal witness. In their contribution to the Symposium Issue, they
invoke the one case to explain the outcome of the other thirty-eight. In methodological
terms, their sample is not merely unrepresentative of their population of interest; it is not
as appropriate.
"Experimenters' regress," which Merlino et al. define, somewhat incompletely, as "deconstruction of the
facts," is a notion posited by Professor Collins which disputes the widely held Popperian notion that theories
can be falsified through "crucial experiments." Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 442. Collins argues that, in fact,
scientists can always dismiss unwelcome experimental results by invoking the claim that the experiment was
performed incompetently. Strictly speaking, Collins argues, there is no limit to the extent to which such
arguments can be deployed, although, in practice, the community of scientists does impose such limits. H.M.
Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (SAGE Publications 1985). Merlino
et al. never make clear where in the Hyatt transcript they perceive the experimenters' regress. See Merlino et
al., supra n. 26, at 443.
61. Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 419 n. I1.
62. See Risinger, supra n. 37, at 461-462, 468-469.
63. I dismiss the possibility that Merlino et al. were intending to smear me. If they had been, they surely
would have reproduced and emphasized the part of the Hyatt opinion that characterizes me as a "junk scientist"
for claiming that there are no reliability studies of latent print identification, as has another of my critics. See
e.g. Andr6 Moenssens, Court Excludes Fingerprint Critic's Testimony as "Junk Science", http://www.forensic-
evidence.com/site/ID/Cole-junksci.html (last accessed Nov. 10, 2009). How pointing out the absence of
evidence supporting an expert's knowledge claims counts as "junk science" remains a mystery to me.
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even included in their population of interest. This is certainly an odd methodological
approach from scholars who take me to task for supposedly making assertions "without
any properly conducted research as a foundation . . . ."
A further question, however, is what sort of explanation for the admissibility of
latent print evidence Merlino et al. are trying to posit by discussing the Hyatt case in
depth. Hyatt itself of course, offers no explanation as to why latent print evidence should
be admissible since that question was not at issue in the case. Instead, by citing Hyatt,
Merlino et al. appear to be taking the position that it is the exclusion of the evidence 's
critics from testifying at trial that renders the evidence admissible. In other words, the
legal principle being expressed appears to be: evidence is reliable if its critics are
unreliable. As Basil Fawlty would say, "[i]t's my fault." 65 Latent print evidence is
reliable not because of empirical data supporting its reliability, but because of something
that a socio-legal scholar did.
I want to be clear that I am taking no position here on the Hyatt holding itself. I
will simply say that I would imagine that somewhat reasonable legal arguments could be
made both for and against allowing the testimony of a rebuttal witness who states that
there is no data concerning the reliability of a technique used by another witness, and,
indeed, courts have split on that issue.66 For example, the issue of whether the testimony
of rebuttal social science experts on the reliability of eyewitness identification should be
admissible is an area of lively legal controversy. 6 7
Merlino et al.'s "[c]ritical examination"68 of Judge Brennan's decision does not
discuss any legal principles that underlies it, other than to say that the decision was "to
[his] credit," and they do not explain why they believe my testimony was appropriately
precluded. One possibility is that they believe there is some principle of law served by
precluding rebuttal witnesses to certain forms of expert evidence under certain
circumstance. But Merlino et al. articulate no such principle. Another possibility is that
they believe that such rebuttal testimony might be appropriate in some cases, but that in
my particular case I relied on inappropriate or unreliable methods to reach the conclusion
to which I was prepared to testify. But, if that is the case, everything hinges on their
misunderstanding of the nature of my testimony. If I were proposing to testify that latent
print identification is "unreliable" (whatever that means), it would, indeed, be
inappropriate to give such testimony without having conducted an empirical study of its
reliability. But if, as was indeed the case, I were proposing to testify that there is no
empirical study of the reliability of latent print identification, I don't know what method,
other than the one I used-searching for such a study in the appropriate literature-
Merlino et al. would have had me use. The third possibility is that Merlino et al. believe
64. Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 444.
65. See supra n. 1 and accompanying epigraph.
66. Cole, Does "Yes" Really Mean Yes? supra n. 30, at 459-460; D. Michael Risinger, Handwriting
Identification, in Science in the Law: Forensic Science Issues 113 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., West 2002).
67. See e.g. Rozelle, supra n. 24, at 600. 1 would imagine that an argument for my testimony would be
rooted in the Sixth Amendment right to rebut the government's testimony. For what it is worth, I would think
that the argument in favor of allowing a counter-expert to rebut the testimony of an expert witness, like a latent
print examiner, would be even stronger than the argument in favor of allowing a counter-expert to rebut the
testimony of a lay eyewitness.
68. Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 443.
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that my testimony was false. If this were true, it would cast doubt not merely on my
proffered testimony, but on my scholarship as well. Was my testimony false? As stated
above, the most efficient and persuasive way to demonstrate that it was would be to
produce a reliability study. But, as I will discuss in Part III, when given the opportunity,
Merlino et al. produced no such study.
The Hyatt court's reasoning is quoted by Merlino et al. so I leave the issue of its
legal persuasiveness to the reader to determine for herself.69 My concern here is not with
the preclusion of my testimony but with the astonishing transformation of the preclusion
of my testimony into supposed evidence of the reliability of latent print evidence. Again,
the argument appears to be that if rebuttal witnesses to a form of proffered evidence are
lacking in reliability, then the evidence itself must be reliable. Surely, Merlino et al. do
not want to advance this as a principle-legal, rational, or otherwise? Should we admit
para-psychological evidence because one of its chief debunkers, James "The Amazing"
Randi, is a magician and therefore is "lacking in scientific method?" 70 Even if we, for
the sake of argument, take the Hyatt court at its word and assume that it was correct in
stating that my testimony was "lacking in scientific method," that does not in any way
render latent print evidence reliable.
III. So, Is LATENT PRINT IDENTIFICATION RELIABLE?
In addition to being faulty reasoning, Merlino et al.'s hanging of the reliability of
latent print identification on the supposed unreliability of its supposed critics has a
second unfortunate consequence: preventing them from fully engaging in the scholarly
debate over the reliability of latent print identification. As discussed above, at least four
contributors to the Symposium Issue take the position that the reliability of latent print
identification has not been demonstrated, whereas Merlino et al., though they do not
explicitly say so, appear to take the opposite view. In this section, I discuss the
evidence put forward by Merlino et al. in support of the claim that the reliability of latent
69. For the full text of the decision, see Hyatt, No. 50115U.
70. In fact, Randi is a proponent of a rigorously defined "scientific method." See generally T.J. Pinch &
H.M. Collins, Private Science and Public Knowledge: The Committee for the Scientific Investigation of the
Claims of the Paranormal and Its Use of the Literature, 14 Soc. Stud. of Sci. 521 (Nov. 1984).
71. The text of Merlino et al.'s article is somewhat ambiguous as to whether they believe that the reliability
of latent print identification has been established. As will be discussed infra Part III.A, at one point they state,
"[t]he reliability of latent print examination methods is supported," though they do not say "established," "by
the use of Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS)." Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 437. At another
point, they write of "terms" that "collectively refer to the methodology of latent print examination (i.e. ACE-
V), its reliability, [and] the methods used to test its reliability . . . ." Id. at 432. At another point, they state that
"forensic practitioners have responded to the questions about the reliability of their testimony by seeking ways
to both improve their disciplines and demonstrate to judges, attorneys, academicians, and fellow experts that
their underlying assumptions, methods, and conclusions meet the requirements of the Daubert trilogy." Id. at
418. This would seem to indicate that they believe that latent print identification already satisfies Daubert's
reliability requirement. However, elsewhere they state that latent print examiners "are working to define and
establish valid and reliable measures of proficiency and error," which would seem to suggest that the
establishment of reliability remains an ongoing project. Id. at 444. It should be noted that it is not sufficient to
simply say that the establishment of reliability will always be a work-in-progress, as methods improve and
science progresses. While the reliability of latent print identification (i.e. its accuracy rate) might be expected to
improve over time, the contributors to the Symposium Issue have argued that no adequate reliability
measurements have yet been put forward on behalf of latent print identification. This is a claim that is either
true or false.
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print identification has been demonstrated. On each point, I show that the evidence is
unconvincing. Moreover, on most points, I show that published scholarship exists that
states that the arguments they muster do not logically support claims of the reliability of
latent print identification.72 This is, of course, by no means to say that this published
scholarship is correct on each of these points. But, if Merlino et al. reject these
arguments, it is incumbent upon them to explain why. Instead, as I will show below,
none of these arguments are discussed or even cited by Merlino et al.
A. Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems
Merlino et al. make no reference to any empirical study of the reliability of latent
print identification. They do, however, refer to various evidentiary items that, I assume,
they believe support the reliability of latent print identification. Only on one occasion,
however, do they affirmatively state that a particular piece of evidence supports the
reliability of latent print identification: "[t]he reliability of latent print examination
methods is supported by the use of the Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems
(AFIS)."73 AFIS search prints against databases of prints and produce lists of candidate
matches. AFIS manufacturers make no claim that the top candidate is the true source of
the searched print. Indeed, AFIS will produce candidate lists even if the true source is not
in the database. Therefore, AFIS do not generate conclusions of source; human latent
print examiners do. What, then, can we infer from the existence of AFIS searches?
Merlino et al.'s argument is that AFIS searches generate candidate prints that are very
similar to the searched prints. "Similarity, however, is not identity." 74 Presumably, the
inference is that no two candidate prints are identical, or all are unique. But, if this is
meant to support the reliability of latent print identification, it invokes what Saks and
Koehler have called the "individualization fallacy" and what I have called the
"fingerprint examiner's fallacy," the claim that the reliability of a forensic technique can
be inferred from the uniqueness of the target object. 75 This reasoning has been widely
criticized in the forensic literature. The relevant question imder Daubert is the
72. Since publication of the Symposium Issue, a National Research Council Report has concluded that
neither latent print identification nor forensic document examination has demonstrated their ability to reach
correct conclusions about the sources of forensic traces. Natl. Research Council of the Natil. Acads., supra n.
36, at 7.
73. Merlino et al. supra n. 26, at 437. AFIS are computer systems designed to search unknown prints
against databases of known prints. Although AFIS are sometimes used to match complete sets of prints, when
searching latent prints they do not produce "matches" but rather candidate lists against which human latent
print examiner can compare the unknown print. See id
74. Id.
75. Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koebler, The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence, 61
Vand. L. Rev. 199 (2008); Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings from
Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1189, 1197-1203 (2004).
76. Keith Inman & Norah Rudin, Principles and Practice of Criminalistics: The Profession of Forensic
Science 54 (CRC Press 2001); John I. Thornton & Joseph L. Peterson, The General Assumptions and Rationale
of Forensic Identification, in Science in the Law: Forensic Science Issues 1, 25 (David L. Faigman et al. eds.,
West 2002); David A. Stoney, Measurement of Fingerprint Individuality, in Advances in Fingerprint
Technology 327 (Henry C. Lee & R. E. Gaensslen eds., 2d ed., CRC Press 2001); see also Christophe
Champod & Ian W. Evett, A Probabilistic Approach to Fingerprint Evidence, 51 J. Forensic Identification 101,
115 (2001); Didier Meuwly, Forensic Individualisation from Biometric Data, 46(4) Sci. & Just. 205, 207
(2006); David J. Balding, Weight-of-Evidence for Forensic DNA Profiles 54 (Wiley & Sons 2005); B.W.N.
Robertson, Fingerprints, Relevance and Admissibility, 2 N.Z. Recent L. Rev. 252, 255 (1990).
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reliability of latent print identification, not the uniqueness of human friction ridge skin,
which, even if true, is only necessary but not sufficient for the testimonial claims latent
print examiners make. But Merlino et al. neither rebut, nor even cite, any of this
literature.
Merlino et al. go on to say, "[u]tilizing the full scope of quantitative-qualitative
analysis, forensic scientists are able to discriminate between the chance correspondence
of limited data sets and proper conclusions of identification based on a complete
analysis."7 In lay terms, I take this to mean that, given an AFIS candidate that appears
quite similar to a searched print, professional latent print examiners are able to
distinguish between: (1) cases in which the cause of the similarity is that the two prints
derive from different sources and yet, by chance, appear quite similar; and (2) cases in
which the cause of the similarity is that the two prints derive from the same source. This
discriminating ability is, of course, precisely what we are asking about when we ask
about the reliability of latent print identification. Merlino et al.'s statement, quoted
above, asserts that latent print examiners "are able" to discriminate in this way, but they
offer no evidence in support of this claim-no measurements of latent print examiners'
discriminating ability at this task. The statement has a footnote, and there one might hope
to find reference to some sort of study or empirical data of this kind. Instead, in the
footnote, we find a discussion of the supposed source of latent print examiners'
"discriminating power,"78 but no reference to any measurement of this supposed
"power."79 At the end of the footnote, there are two citations, but these are references to
two studies that used computers, not latent print examiners, to try to discriminate
between prints from the same source and prints from different sources.80 Merlino et al.
are not the first to try to infer the reliability of latent print identification from the
existence of AFIS searches. Both latent print practitioners and courts have previously
mounted such arguments. I have critiqued these efforts and argued that the reliability of
latent print identification cannot be inferred from the existence of AFIS searches. 8 1
Merlino et al. do not rebut, or even cite, these arguments.
B. One Hundred Years ofEmpirical Data
Aside from AFIS searches, Merlino et al. do not point to any other data that they
explicitly claim supports the reliability of latent print identification. In the guise of
discussing the Daubert factors, however, they do discuss a number of items that, one
might infer, they believe support the reliability of latent print identification. In the
interest of completeness I will discuss these items, even though Merlino et al. do not
77. Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 437 (footnote omitted).
78. Id. at 437 n. 69. The footnote states, "[a]t least part of this discriminating power stems from the rarity of
features found in the friction ridge skin impression." Id. This would indeed be one important component of any
measurement of discrimination. The other would be the reliability with which the analytic system is able to
perceive those features.
79. Id.
80. See Christophe Champod et al., Fingerprints and Other Ridge Skin Impressions (CRC Press 2004);
Sargur N. Srihari et al., Discriminability of Fingerprints of Twins, 58 J. Forensic Identification 109 (2008).
81. Simon A. Cole, Is Fingerprint Identification Valid? Rhetorics of Reliability in Fingerprint Proponents'
Discourse, 28 L. & Policy 109 (2006) [hereinafter Cole, Is Fingerprint Identification Valid?]; Cole, Does "Yes"
Really Mean Yes? supra n. 30.
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explicitly state that they support the reliability of latent print identification. I will again
show that these items of evidence cannot support the reliability of latent print
identification and, in most cases, that arguments on this point exist in the published
literature.
Merlino et al. state that "[latent print examination draws on ... over one-hundred
[sic] years of empirical data collected by practitioners." 82 It is difficult to infer from the
text what they mean by this. It is possible that they are referring to latent print
examiners' collective experience observing latent prints in which they have supposedly
never observed two exactly identical complete fingertip-sized areas of friction ridge skin.
Of course, if one were to treat latent print examiners going about their duties as empirical
data collection, one would have to note that the data is in no way being systematically
collected, recorded, organized, or classified. But, more importantly, this argument, like
the argument discussed in the previous section, invokes the "fingerprint examiner's
fallacy" because it speaks only to the supposed "uniqueness" of human friction ridge
skin, not to the issue of the reliability of latent print identification.
It is also possible that Merlino et al. are referring to casework performed by latent
print examiners. In that case, the argument is presumably that each case functions as a de
facto experiment testing the accuracy of the latent print examiner's conclusion. However,
casework cannot constitute empirical data concerning the reliability of latent print
identification because the ground truth is not known in casework. Many other latent print
proponents have advanced the casework argument,83 and the argument has been disputed
in the scholarly literature.84 Indeed, the casework argument is even disputed by a federal
judge in one of the cases in Merlino et al.'s data set.85 They offer no rebuttal, or even
awareness, of these arguments.
C. Research on Latent Print Examiners' Cognition
Merlino et al. state that Busey and Vanderkolk have "undertaken research" on
latent print examiners' cognitive processes and that "preliminary results suggest that
expert latent print examiners exhibit discrete adaptive changes in cognitive processing
related to the pattern recognition of finger prints."86 In layman's terms, I take this to
mean that latent print examiners' brains react differently when looking at fingerprint
patterns than do laypersons' brains. Needless to say, this research, even if it were not
"preliminary" would not establish the reliability of latent print identification. And, to
their credit, Merlino et al. do not explicitly say that it does.
82. Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 434.
83. Cole, Is Fingerprint Identification Valid? supra n. 81.
84. See Simon A. Cole, "Implicit Testing": Can Casework Validate Forensic Techniques? 46 Jurimetrics
117 (2006); Lyn Haber & Ralph Haber, Scientific Validation of Fingerprint Evidence under Daubert, 7 L.,
Probability and Risk 87, 96 (2008); Tamara F. Lawson, Can Fingerprints Lie? Re-weighing Fingerprint
Evidence in Criminal Jury Trials, 31 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 37 (2003); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence
in An Age ofDNA Profiling, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 13, 65 (2001).
85. US. v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
86. Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 435.
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D. Descriptive and Experimental Studies: Anatomical Research
In the section titled "Falsifiability,"8 7 Merlino et al. state that "[m]any studies, both
descriptive and experimental, exist concerning the theories and methods of latent print
examination." They then go on to discuss some anatomical research on the formation
of friction ridge skin, the anatomical structure of which "fingerprints" are
representations, which they characterize as "descriptive studies." 89 But anatomical
researchers say nothing about the reliability of latent print identification. Anatomical
researchers are concerned with the formation of friction ridge skin, and they have
nothing to say about the reliability of latent print identification as practiced by latent
print examiners. Merlino et al. state that "the contemporary work of investigators such as
William Babler and others .. . provide the scientific mechanism for the uniqueness and
permanence of friction ridge skin." 90
Again, Merlino et al. are hardly the first to make this argument. Proponents of
latent print identification have long argued that anatomical research supports claims
about its reliability.9 1 Merlino et al. do not explicitly state how it is they think the
reliability of latent print identification may be inferred from anatomical research, and,
indeed, I have argued that anatomical knowledge about the formation of friction ridge
skin tells us very little about the reliability of latent print identification. 92 Anatomical
knowledge does support the claim that friction ridge skin is highly variable, and accurate
latent print identification would be extremely difficult if friction ridge skin were not so
variable. But variability does not tell us how accurate latent print identification actually
is. I have also argued that Dr. Babler has said nothing about the reliability of latent print
identification and that he has never claimed to have proven the uniqueness of friction
ridge skin but merely asserted it.93 Of course, I could be wrong. But Merlino et al.
neither rebut nor even cite these arguments.
It is not clear what precisely Merlino et al. had in mind when they stated that there
were "experimental" studies on the theory and method of latent print analysis. But this
section does not refer to any formal studies beyond the anatomical ones, and Merlino et
al. do not use the term "experimental studies" anywhere else in this section.
E. Error Rate
Merlino et al. engage in an extensive discussion of the error rate of latent print
identification. Although Merlino et al. do not explicitly connect the notion of error rate to
that of reliability, it could reasonably be said that an empirically based estimated error
87. In my view, it is incorrect to characterize the first Daubert prong as "falsifiability," rather than as, say,
"testing." It seems clear to me that Daubert asks not merely whether proffered experts make falsifiable claims,
but whether their falsifiable claims have survived vigorous efforts at falsification, i.e. "testing."
88. Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 435.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Andre Moenssens, Fingerprint Identification: A Valid Reliable "Forensic Science"? 18 Crim. Just. 31
(2003); Andre Moenssens, The Reliability ofFingerprint Identification: A Case Report, http://www.forensic-
evidence.com/siteID/pollak2002.html (last updated Jan. 18, 2002).
92. Cole, Is Fingerprint Identification Valid? supra n. 81.
93. Id.; see also Simon A. Cole, Out of the Daubert Fire and into the Fryeing Pan? The Admissibility of
Latent Print Evidence in Frye Jurisdictions, 9 Minn. J. L. Sci. & Tech. 453 (2008).
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rate would constitute the estimated reliability (or, more precisely, the estimated
accuracy) of latent print identification. Therefore, Merlino et al.'s comments on error rate
seem quite relevant.
Merlino et al. argue that estimating the error rate of latent print identification
through an experimental validation study, as proposed by Drs. Haber and Haber, "seems
quite problematic." 94 Their reason is that the variability, or substructuring, among
laboratories that perform latent print analysis prevents the calculation of a meaningful
industry-wide error rate. In fact, variability among laboratories does not pose an
insurmountable obstacle to the calculation of an error rate. Statisticians, quality
assurance auditors, failure analysis engineers, and many others regularly calculate
industry-wide error rates, despite comparable variability. The variability of forensic
laboratories is no greater or more daunting than the variability of other techno-social
endeavors for which "error" or "failure" rates are regularly calculated, like airplane
crashes. Variability poses methodological difficulties but not insurmountable ones. Once
again, Merlino et al.'s argument has been mounted before and rebutted before, most
notably by Professor Koehler. 95 Of course, Professor Koehler could be wrong on this
point, but his argument is, again, neither rebutted nor cited.
F. Certification
It is perhaps worth making one clarification regarding the issue of certification,
which is also discussed by Merlino et al. The authors note that the International
Association for Identification (IAI), a professional organization, administers a
certification program. They note that applicants for certification with "two years
experience in the field ... must first document their education, training, and professional
experience, and must then pass a detailed written examination comprised of latent print
comparison exercises, pattern interpretation of inked prints, and a series of questions"
pertinent to fingerprint analysis.96 Their discussion, however, does not make it entirely
clear that certification apparently has little to do with the admissibility or reliability of
latent print testimony as practiced in the United States for the simple reason that not all
latent print analysts in the United States are certified. The IAI has taken the position that
certification is not a requirement for competent latent print analysis, and there are many
uncertified latent print analysts practicing and testifying in United States courtrooms.97
Merlino et al. do not report that certification makes a difference in judges' determination
of the admissibility of latent print testimony, and indeed, I am aware of no case in which
a judge has made IAI certification a requirement for admissibility. Thus, even if
certification made latent print identification reliable-and Merlino et al. do not claim that
94. Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 438; Haber & Haber, supra n. 84.
95. Jonathan J. Koehler, Proving the Case: The Science of DNA: On Conveying the Probative Value of
DNA Evidence: Frequencies, Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 859, 873 (1996).
Professor Koehler expands on this argument, specifically with regard to latent print identification. Jonathan J.
Koehler, Fingerprint Error Rates and Proficiency Tests: What They Are and Why They Matter, 59 Hastings
L.J. 1077 (2008). However, it should be noted that this latter article was published after the Symposium. See
also Cole, supra n. 56, at 1037.
96. Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 434.
97. James R. McConnell, Certification (To Be or Not to Be), 42 J. Forensic Identification 205 (1992); Pat
A. Wertheim, re: Certification (To Be or Not to Be), 42 J. Forensic Identification 280 (1992).
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it does-it appears to exert little or no influence on judges who routinely admit latent
print evidence whether certified or not.
G. General Acceptance
Merlino et al. argue that latent print identification meets the "general acceptance"
requirement that was stated in Frye v. US. and then integrated into Daubert and its
progeny case Kumho Tire v. Carmichael.98 This is because "[t]he relevant scientific
community for latent print examiners includes members of forensic science
organizations such as the International Association of [sic] Identification and the
American Academy of Forensic Sciences [AAFS], which encompass many forensic
disciplines." 99 Again, this is a familiar argument. I have, however, argued, first, that
there is little explicit evidence that practitioners of disciplines other than latent print
analysis "accept" that the reliability of latent print analysis has been established-indeed,
it is not clear to me that the membership of the AAFS actually does accept the notion that
latent print individualization has been validated; and, second, that treating members of
the IAI (i.e. professional latent print analysts) as the relevant community for the
evaluation of the claim that the reliability of latent print analysis has been established
amounts to "self-validat[ion.]" 10 0 Courts have looked dimly on this notion of self-
validation when applied to other forms of evidence. Again, this work is neither rebutted
nor cited by Merlino et al., although, in fairness, its publication postdated the writing of
their article.
In summary, Merlino et al.'s arguments in support of the reliability of latent print
identification rest upon many of the same arguments that have been mustered by other
proponents of latent print identification: that friction ridge skin is unique; that there is
anatomical research on the formation of friction ridge skin; the AFIS searches do not
produce duplicate prints; the latent print examiners use a process; that there is education
and training; that some examiners are certified; that some quality control measures are in
place; that the reliability of latent print identification is accepted by professional latent
print examiners. In repeating these arguments, Merlino et al. have not taken account of
the extensive criticisms of these arguments that have been mounted by legal scholars,
forensic scientists, and other scholars.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Reply, I have objected to Merlino et al.'s characterization of my testimony
in Hyatt and the inclusion of their characterization, unremarked upon, in their
contribution to the Symposium Issue of this journal. 101 I have objected on both empirical
grounds and in the interest of promoting civil, reputable scholarly discourse.
On empirical grounds, I have argued that my testimony fails to serve as evidence
for the argument for which they use it because it was not representative of the population
98. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
99. Merlinoet al.,supran. 26, at 441.
100. Bert Black, A Unfied Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 595, 633 (1988); Cole, supra
n. 93.
101. Jane Campbell Moriarty, Symposium Foreword, 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 229 (2007).
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of cases Merlino et al. purport to explain. Moreover, the explanation they construct
around my testimony-that the reliability of expert testimony can be imputed from the
supposed untrustworthiness of its rebutters-even if it were empirically true, would
constitute an astonishingly circular form of scientific or legal reasoning. I suggested that,
rather than simply present such a seemingly bizarre legal argument with a straight face,
Merlino et al. might reasonably be expected either to "[c]ritically examin[e]"102 it, or to
defend it.
With regard to the promotion of scholarly discourse, I have argued that Merlino et
al.'s use of my testimony is problematic for two reasons. First, it may reasonably be read
as an attack on my qualifications to speak, rather than my arguments. Presented with a
manuscript that characterized one of its contributors as someone who makes empirical
assertions "without any properly conducted research as a foundation for such
assertions," 103 one might have expected a journal that takes seriously the policing of
published scholarship to investigate the matter. If it were true that I make empirical
assertions "without any properly conducted research as a foundation for such
assertions,',104 then perhaps my contribution ought not to be published, or, at least, those
assertions should be removed. If, on the other hand, that accusation was false, then
perhaps the contribution that made the accusation ought not to be published, or, at least,
the groundless accusation should be removed.
Most disappointingly of all, Merlino et al.'s focus on one judge's characterization
of my testimony seems to have distracted them from engaging with scholars who hold
opinions different from theirs, myself included. Although I have authored numerous
scholarly articles which speak to many of the points made by Merlino et al., not a single
one is cited. A reader of their article would come away with the perception that I am a
professional witness, rather than a scholar. Nor, with two exceptions,105 do they cite any
of the literature by the many other excellent scholars who have published on many of the
issues they address.106 Of course, Merlino et al. are scholars who are free to cite
102. Merlino et al., supra n. 26, at 443.
103. Id. at 444.
104. Id.
105. The exceptions are: Haber & Haber, supra n. 84; Mnookin, supra n. 84. See Merlino et al., supra n. 26,
at 43 7, 44 1.
106. Some of the literature they might have engaged with would include David Faigman et al., Modern
Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony § 27-2.3.1, at 386 (2nd ed., West 2002) ("Woe
to fingerprint practice were such [Daubert admissibility] criteria applied!"); Michael Saks, Merlin and
Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 Hastings L.J.
1069, 1106 (1998) ("By conventional scientific standards, any serious search for evidence of the validity of
fingerprint identification is going to be disappointing .... A vote to admit fingerprints is a rejection of
conventional science as the criterion for admission. A vote for science is a vote to exclude fingerprint expert
opinions." (footnote omitted)); James E. Starrs, Judicial Control Over Scientific Supermen: Fingerprint
Experts and Others Who Exceed the Bounds, 35 Crim. L. Bull. 234, 243 (1999) ("Instead of meaning being
incapable of error, fingerprint identifications are declared to be infallible on account of the uniqueness of
fingerprints to each person . . ."); David A. Stoney, supra n. 76, at 383 ("From a statistical viewpoint, the
scientific foundation for fingerprint individuality is incredibly weak."); David L. Faigman, Is Science Different
for Lawyers? 297 Sci. 339, 340 (2002) (fingerprinting has "not been seriously tested"); Paul Giannelli,
Fingerprints Challenged! 17 Crim. Just. 33, 35 (Spring 2002) ("In its interpretation of Daubert, Plaza I is a
well-written opinion. Havvard is not."); Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint
"Science" is Revealed, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 605, 657 (2002) ("Having considered the various indicators of
reliability set forth by the Supreme Court in Daubert, it is evident that at the present time, latent fingerprint
identifications do not constitute reliable evidence."); Jessica M. Sombat, Latent Justice: Daubert's Impact on
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whomever they wish. But because of its failure to respond to or cite the scholarly
literature that addresses the points it makes, Merlino et al.'s article fails to engage in the
kind of scholarly discourse that would move the debate forward. One would hope that, in
the pages of law journals at least, the debate over the reliability of latent print
identification can be based on evidence and logical arguments. Perhaps, a debate of that
kind can now begin.
the Evaluation of Fingerprint Identification Testimony, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 2819, 2825 (2002) ("the result
Judge Pollak reached when he excluded expert testimony concerning fingerprints [in Llera Plaza 1] was fair.");
Recent Cases, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2349, 2352 (2002) ("Fingerprint expert testimony does not survive application
of the Daubert factors. . ."); Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Error Rates for Human Latent Fingerprint
Examiners, in Automatic Fingerprint Recognition Systems 339 (Nalini Ratha & Ruud Bolle eds., Springer
2004) (pointing out that no data have been collected on how accurately latent print examiners match different
images of the same finger); Donald Kennedy, Forensic Science: Oxymoron? 302 Sci. 1625, 1625 (2003)
(Fingerprinting's "reliability is unverified either by statistical models of fingerprint variation or by consistent
data on error rates"); David H. Kaye, The Nonscience of Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera Plaza, 21 QLR
1073, 1087 (2003) ("As Llera-Plaza I so clearly reveals, this [the evidence advanced in support of the
admissibility of latent fingerprint individualization] does not satisfy Daubert."); Jennifer L. Mnookin,
Fingerprints: Not a Gold Standard, 20 Issues Sci. & Tech. 47, 47 (2003) ("Judge Pollak's first opinion
[restricting latent fingerprint individualization testimony] was the better one."); Tamara F. Lawson, Can
Fingerprints Lie? Re-weighing Fingerprint Evidence in Criminal Jury Trials, 31 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 65 (2003)
("Currently fingerprint analysis is under attack because of the lack of study done on the accuracy of the
examiners..."); Tara Marie La Morte, Sleeping Gatekeepers: United States v. Llera Plaza and the
Unreliability of Forensic Fingerprinting Evidence under Daubert, 14 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 171, 173 (2003)
(discussing "strong indications that the fingerprinting field should not survive a rigorous Daubert analysis"
(footnote omitted)); Jane Campbell Moriarty, Psychological and Scientific Evidence in Criminal Trials vol. 1, §
12:15 (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1996) ("The assumption of the validity of fingerprinting rests upon law,
rather than science."); Nathan Benedict, Fingerprints and the Daubert Standard for Admission of Scientific
Evidence: Why Fingerprints Fail and a Proposed Remedy, 46 Ariz. L. Rev. 519, 538 (2004) ("[J]udges have
generally relied on their instincts and the long history of judicial acceptance of fingerprint evidence to admit it
without serious consideration of the science behind it."); Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. &
Policy 143, 178 (2005). ("ACE-V is an acronym, not a methodology." (emphasis in original)); Michael Mears
& Therese M. Day, The Challenge of Fingerprint Comparison Opinions in the Defense of a Criminally
Charged Client, 19 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 705, 745 (2003); Katherine Schwinghammer, Fingerprint Identification:
How "The Gold Standard Of Evidence" Could Be Worth Its Weight, 32 Am. J. Crim. L. 265 (2005).
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